In 1914, the Supreme Court ruled that evidence seized illegally in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is inadmissible in federal courts. The so-called “exclusionary rule” was thus born. In 1949, the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment is “incorporated” by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus now applies to the states. However, the Court declined to apply “the exclusionary rule” to the states. Thus, evidence seized illegally in violation of the Fourth Amendment was still admissible against the accused in state courts.

In 1957, Cleveland, Ohio, police arrived at Dollree Mapp’s home searching for a man believed to be involved in a recent car bombing and for evidence involving an illegal gambling operation. Mapp refused to admit them, and they had no search warrant. The officers left, but soon returned, knocked on the door, and when Mapp did not immediately answer, they opened the door and entered. When Mapp appeared and demanded to see a search warrant, she was shown a piece of paper which she snatched away from the officer. The officer retrieved the paper and handcuffed Mapp. The police then searched the entire house but found no bombing suspect and no evidence of an illegal gambling operation. However, they did find some obscene material, possession of which was at the time a violation of Ohio law. At her trial in an Ohio court on a charge of possession of obscene literature, no search warrant was produced, and the failure to produce one was not explained. After her conviction, Mapp appealed to higher Ohio courts which upheld her conviction, and she then appealed to the Supreme Court.

By a 6-3 vote, the Supreme Court overturned Mapp’s conviction and for the first time applied “the exclusionary rule” to state courts. As a result, evidence obtained by police in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used against the defendant in either a federal or a state court.

The New York Board of Regents, a government agency created by the New York Constitution, composed a prayer and recommended its use to the state’s public schools. The Board of Education for a public school district in the state then required its schools to begin each school day with the Regents composed prayer. Parents of ten students brought suit in a New York court challenging the constitutionality of the prayer because it was contrary to their religious beliefs and those of their children. They argued that the prayer was a violation of the no establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment. The trial court upheld use of the prayer so long as the school did not compel any student to participate over parents’ objections. A New York Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s judgment, and the parents then appealed to the Supreme Court.

By a 6-1 vote, with two justices not participating, the Supreme Court overturned the judgment of the New York courts and ruled that requiring public school students to recite a government composed prayer is a violation of the no establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Hugo Black stated: “It is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as part of a religious program carried on by government.”

The Tennessee Constitution requires apportionment of both houses of the state legislature on the basis of population after the census every ten years. However, since 1901, no apportionment had been carried out in spite of changes in population growth and the movement of large numbers of people from rural areas to urban areas of the state. As a result, by 1960, the state’s House districts districts varied in population from 3,454 to 79,301, and the state’s Senate districts varied in population from 39,727 to 237,905. Residents of several Tennessee urban areas filed suit in a federal court against Joe Carr, the Tennessee Secretary of State, and other state officials. They argued that Tennessee’s failure to reapportion since 1901 denied them the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The lower federal court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction based on the Supreme Court’s decision in the 1946 case Colegrove v Green. In that case, the Court ruled that federal courts did not have jurisdiction to hear cases involving the drawing of legislative districts because this was a “political question” to be answered by the elected branches of government. The plaintiffs then appealed to the Supreme Court.

By a 6-2 vote (one justice not participating), the Supreme Court overturned the Colegrove v Green ruling. The Court held that under the equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, federal courts do have jurisdiction to hear cases involving the drawing of legislative districts.

The Court’s decision in Baker v Carr led to later Court decisions often referred to as the Court’s “one man-one vote” rulings which had a major impact on the distribution of political power between urban and rural areas in state legislatures, the U. S. House of Representatives, and county commissioners courts.

After his retirement as Chief Justice of the U. S. from 1953-1969, Earl Warren was asked what he regarded as the most significant case decided during his tenure as Chief Justice. His answer was Baker v Carr.

In 1961, Clarence Earl Gideon was arrested in Florida and charged with breaking and entering a poolroom with intent to commit petty larceny. Gideon was indigent and thus unable to afford a lawyer. At his trial in a state court, he asked the judge to appoint a lawyer to represent him. His request was denied because under Florida law at that time, an indigent was entitled to the assistance of a lawyer provided by the state only if charged with a capital offense. Under U. S. constitutional law at that time, as decided by the Supreme Court, a state was only required to appoint a lawyer if the accused was a victim of “special circumstances” such as feeblemindedness, illiteracy, youth, etc. Gideon did not claim any “special circumstances.” Gideon defended himself, but a jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to five years in prison. After losing an appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, he prepared a handwritten petition asking the U. S. Supreme Court to consider his appeal. The Supreme Court agreed to do so, and furthermore, the Supreme Court appointed a lawyer to argue his case before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court chose Abe Fortas, a prominent Washington, D. C. attorney who had appeared frequently before that Court and a future Supreme Court justice.

A unanimous Supreme Court overturned Gideon’s conviction. The Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel now applies to the states using the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the doctrine of “incorporation” and requires that in any serious criminal case in a state court, if the accused cannot afford a lawyer, the state must provide one. The Court called the right to a lawyer “fundamental” and necessary for a fair trial.

Gideon was retried before the same judge in the same courtroom, but this time he had a court-appointed lawyer and was acquitted.

In another case some years later, the Supreme Court extended the right to a lawyer to any criminal case in a state court in which a jail sentence of any length is a possible outcome.

L. B. Sullivan, an elected City Commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama, brought a libel suit against four African American ministers and the New York Times. He argued that he had been libeled by certain statements in a full-page advertisement entitled “Heed Their Rising Voices” which appeared in the Times. The advertisement described the civil rights movement in the South. Although Sullivan was not mentioned by name, he argued that the word “police” in the ad referred to him because he was the city commissioner who supervised the Police Department. It was not disputed that some statements in the ad were not accurate descriptions which had occurred in Montgomery. A jury in a lower Alabama found for Sullivan and awarded him $500,000 in damages, a judgment affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court. The New York Times appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Alabama Supreme Court’s judgment and thus ruled in favor of the New York Times. In doing so, the Court interpreted the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press to establish the following rule for what public officials must prove to win a libel suit for defamatory falsehoods relating to their official conduct: a public official must prove that the defamatory statement about his official conduct was made with “actual malice” – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

This “actual malice” rule in reality has meant that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for a public official to win a libel suit relating to his official conduct.

A Connecticut law adopted in 1879 made it a crime for any person to give information about or use any drug, article, or instrument to prevent contraception. The Executive Director, Estelle Griswold, and Medical Director of the Planned Parenthood of Connecticut were charged, tried, and convicted of violating the law by giving information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons regarding means of preventing conception. Their conviction was affirmed by the Connecticut Supreme Court, and they then appealed to the Supreme Court.

By a 7-2 vote, the Supreme Court reversed their conviction and ruled that the Connecticut law was unconstitutional because it infringed on the constitutionally protected right to “privacy” of married people. The majority concluded that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance,” and that “various guarantees create zones of privacy” into which government cannot intrude. The majority asserted that the right to privacy was inherent in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments and that states must honor it based on the Fourteenth amendment’s due process of law clause and the doctrine of incorporation.

On March 3, 1963, an eighteen year-old girl was kidnapped and raped near Phoenix, Arizona. Ten days afterwards, the police arrested Ernesto Miranda, a twenty-three year-old, and charged him with kidnapping and rape. At the police station, the rape victim identified Miranda in a polce lineup as her attacker. He was interrogated by police and never told he had the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. At first he denied his guilt but eventually confessed and wrote and signed a statement admitting and describing the crime. At his trial, the confession was admitted into evidence, and he was convicted of kidnapping and rape. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, and Miranda appealed to the Supreme Court.

By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court overturned Miranda’s conviction. Speaking through Chief Justice Earl Warren, the majority held that if police do not inform the accused of certain constitutional rights, including their Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination, then their confessions may not be used as evidence against them at trial. Warren summarized the Court’s holding: “When an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. … The accused must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”

At a meeting in Des Moines, Iowa, in late 1965, some adults and students discussed how they could publicize their opposition to American involvement in the Vietnam War. The students later decided that they would wear black armbands to school to show their opposition to the war and their support for a proposed truce. When the principals of their schools became aware of the students’ plan, they adopted a policy that any student joining the protest would be asked to remove the armbands and that any student who refused to do so would be suspended until agreeing to return without the armband. Mary Beth Tinker, a thirteen year-old junior high student, and Christopher Eckhardt, a high school student, wore black armbands to their schools. John Tinker and several other students at another high school did the same. No disturbances on school property occurred. The students were sent home and told that they could come back to school if they removed the armbands. The students’ parents filed a complaint in a U. S. District Court and asked for an injunction restraining school officials from disciplining the students, but the court dismissed the complaint. The parents unsuccessfully appealed to a U. S. Court of Appeals and then appealed to the Supreme Court.

By a 7-2 vote, the Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s judgment and ruled in favor of the First Amendment speech rights of public school students. The majority noted that wearing the arm bands was “closely akin to pure speech” protected by the First Amendment. In a memorable, famous statement, the Court held: “First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate…”

State laws in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island allowed the state to provide financial support for the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in parochial and other nonpublic schools and for the cost of textbooks and instructional materials in specified secular subjects in those schools. A U. S. District Court found that the Rhode Island law violated the no establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment, but another U. S. District Court found that the Pennsylvania law did not do so. The two cases were appealed to the Supreme Court which consolidated them for decision purposes.

A unanimous Supreme Court declared both state laws unconstitutional as violations of the no establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment. In doing so, the Court established a new test now called “the Lemon test” for deciding cases involving the First Amendment’s establishment clause. The “Lemon test” has three prongs. For a law not to be a violation of the establishment clause, it must meet the following conditions: (1) it must have a secular purpose; (2) its principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it must not result in excessive government entanglement with religion. If a law does not satisfy any one of the three prongs, the law is unconstitutional.

Bremerton High School football coach Joseph Kennedy, a devout Christian, routinely would engage in individual prayer on the 50-yard line after games, expressing gratitude for the safety of the players and honoring the sportsmanship and competition amongst the students. When students asked to join, he asserted they could exercise their free will, and many chose to join him over the years, including members of other teams. On occasion, Coach Kennedy would deliver motivational speeches to those participating in the prayers. After a complaint by an employee of another high school, Coach Kennedy was directed to stop the public prayers as he was operating on behalf of the school. The school district, concerned that Kennedy’s actions demonstrated endorsement of religion, suggested a compromise to allow for Kennedy’s free exercise of religion. He was offered a place for private prayer after the game and then allowed to use the field for prayer once all students had vacated. Kennedy refused this offer and filed a suit in federal district court, asserting the actions of the school to be a violation of his 1st amendment rights and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The Supreme Court agreed with Kennedy that the school district had unconstitutionally restricted both his freedom of religion and freedom of speech. Coach Kennedy’s prayers happened after the game and thus did not represent state endorsement of religion in any manner. In the majority opinion, the Court addresses the Lemon test derived from the decision in Lemon v Kurtzman. They claim the endorsement test, part of the Lemon decision, was troublesome, leading to confusion in its application. The new standard for assessing violations of the Establishment Clause requires examination of “historical practices and understandings” of religious behavior. Through this lens, there is no violation of the Establishment Clause.

In 1971, with growing opposition to American involvement in the Vietnam War, the New York Times, and a few days later, the Washington Post began publishing articles based on a top-secret Rand Corporation but government commissioned study of American involvement in Vietnam. The New York Times had received copies of the study called “the Pentagon Papers” from a man named Daniel Ellsberg who had worked at the Rand Corporation. After the New York Times began publishing selected items from the study, the U. S. government sought an injunction from a U. S. District Court prohibiting further publication. When the Washington Post a few days later also began publishing items from the study, the government filed a similar suit against the Posts’ further publication. The New York Times and the Washington Post promptly appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Court granted expedited consideration of the two cases.

By a 6-3 vote, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the New York Times and the Washington Post. The majority concluded that the U. S. government had violated the First Amendment’s freedom of the press when it attempted to stop publication of “the Pentagon Papers.” Citing the Court’s 1931 decision in Near v Minnesota, the majority noted that “prior restraint” by government of publication by the press is hardly ever permitted.

Jonas Yoder and two other men were Amish. The Amish believe that salvation requires life in a church community separate and apart from the world and that members of the community must make their living by farming or closely related activities. Yoder and the other Amish men lived in Wisconsin where a compulsory school attendance law required children to attend public or private school until reaching sixteen-years-of-age. The Amish men’s children had finished the eighth grade in public school but had not attended any school thereafter. The Amish object to their children attending high school because values taught there were very different from Amish values and the Amish way of life. They believe that their children in the high school years should be acquiring Amish attitudes toward manual work and acquiring specific skills needed to perform the adult role of an Amish farmer or housewife. The local public school district brought a complaint against the men charging them with violating Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance law. The Amish argued that the law violated their free exercise of religion as guaranteed by the First Amendment. The parents were convicted by a Wisconsin trial court, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed their convictions, and the state appealed to the Supreme Court.

By a 6-1 vote, with two justices not participating, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Amish and held that the First Amendment’s free exercise of religion clause prevents a state from compelling Amish children to attend school to the age of sixteen. The Court concluded that the state’s interest in making sure students attend two more years of school was not enough to outweigh the individual’s right to free exercise of religion.

In 1970, Jane Roe, (a pseudonym) was an unmarried Dallas woman who wished to terminate her pregnancy. Texas, like many states, had a law that made abortion a crime except in cases of danger to the health of the mother. Roe filed a class action lawsuit “on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated” in a U. S. District Court against Henry Wade, the District Attorney of Dallas County, to enjoin the enforcement of the statute. The District Court ruled that the Texas law was unconstitutional and that single women and married women had the constitutional right to choose whether to have children, but the court refused to issue an injunction against enforcement of the law. Roe then appealed to the Supreme Court, and at the same time, the District Attorney cross appealed to the Supreme Court the District Court’s judgment against Texas’ abortion law.

By a 7-2 vote, the Supreme Court upheld the District Court’s judgment declaring the Texas abortion law unconstitutional. The majority held that “the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision.” The Court based its decision in part on the Court’s previous 1965 decision in Griswold v Connecticut and the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Harry Blackmun noted that “although the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy … the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution … This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservations of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” However, the majority continued, the right is not unqualified.

The majority then announced the following rule. In the first trimester of a pregnancy, the abortion decision is left to the woman and her physician. In the second trimester, in the interest of the health of the mother, the state may regulate the procedure in ways reasonably related to maternal health. In the third trimester, the state, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may choose to regulate and even forbid abortion except where medical judgment is that abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.

Mississippi passed the “Gestational Age Act” in 2018. The law prohibits all abortions, with the exceptions of medical emergencies and severe fetal abnormalities, after 15 weeks’ gestation. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (the only licensed abortion provider in Mississippi) challenged the constitutionality of the law in federal court. The district court sided with Jackson and prohibited the state from enforcing the law because the Supreme Court precedent did not allow states to ban abortion prior to viability (15 weeks gestation would be considered previability). The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.

Mississippi State Health Officer, Thomas Dobbs, filed a petition for the Supreme Court to hear the case. In their divided decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution does not mention abortion and that no right to abortion is protected by the Constitution. The court’s decision expressly overruled the precedent set in Roe v Wade (that states cannot ban abortion) and as a result returned the issue of abortion regulation to the state’s elected branches. The dissenting opinion argued that the court unsettled nearly fifty years of precedent.

In June, 1972, some men broke into the headquarters of the National Committee of the Democratic Party in the Watergate complex in Washington, D. C. The men were apprehended, and it soon emerged that they might have connections to President Richard Nixon’s reelection campaign. After Nixon was reelected, congressional committees began searching for possible links between the Watergate break-in and the White House, and at the same time, the trial of the five burglars began. Alexander Butterfield, a former White House aide, appeared as a witness before a Senate committee and revealed that Nixon had tape-recorded conversations in the Oval Office of the President. The Senate committee and a special prosecutor appointed to investigate illegal White House activities immediately sought access to the tapes. President Nixon claimed executive privilege which means he argued that conversations between a President and his advisors are confidential and privileged and that no one can compel that they be divulged. The special prosecutor subpoenaed Nixon to turn over the tapes, but again Nixon refused. The judge of the trial court where the burglars were being tried then ordered their release as did a Court of Appeals. Nixon announced that he would release a summary of the tapes. The Special Prosecutor found this unacceptable and was then fired. Within a few days, Nixon agreed to release some tapes. The House Judiciary Committee began hearings on the possible impeachment of the President. Nixon continued to refuse to turn over more tapes. Meanwhile, a federal grand jury investigating the Watergate affair indicted some top White House aides and secretly named Nixon as an unindicted coconspirator. Eventually, the entire dispute ended up before the Supreme Court.

In a significant defeat for President Nixon personally, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that the President in this instance could not claim executive privilege, and thus the tapes had to be turned over. In the Court’s words: “The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.” However, for the first time in U. S. history, in an important victory for the office of the President, the Court did declare that the President does have the right of executive privilege and it must be shown great respect and deference.

In 1971, Congress adopted the Federal Election Campaign Act in an effort to prevent corruption in federal elections. The law limited how much money individuals could contribute to political candidates and how much money political candidates could spend. Senator James Buckley and others sued Frances Valeo, the Secretary of the Senate, and others and argued that certain parts of the law were unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment’s freedom of speech and association. After losing in a lower federal court, Buckley and the other plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court was extremely divided, and many different opinions were written. The Court came to two very different decisions. First, congressional limits on individual money contributions to political candidates were permissible under the Constitution because of the government’s interest in preventing corruption. On the other hand, congressional limits on the amount of money political candidates could spend were unconstitutional violations of First Amendment rights.

Allan Bakke, a white male, applied to but was denied admission to the medical school of the University of California, Davis which had only 100 openings each year. Sixteen of those positions were reserved for “disadvantaged” minority students (African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans). Bakke had twice before been denied admission while minorities with lower undergraduate grade point averages and lower scores on the Medical College Admission Test had been admitted. Bakke decided to challenge the constitutionality of the university’s admissions policy. He argued that he was denied admission because of his race in violation of the equal protection of the laws clause of the U. S. Constitution’s Fourteen Amendment. A lower state court ruled in Bakke’s favor but declined to order his admission. On appeal, the California Supreme Court ordered Bakke’s admission and held that the university’s admissions policy did violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection of the laws clause. The Regents of the University of California appealed to the Supreme Court.

In this first major constitutional test of so-called “affirmative action” programs, by a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court upheld the California court’s judgment and thus its decision in Bakke’s favor. The Court ruled that state universities cannot use racial quotas in their admissions decisions. Such quotas based on race are unconstitutional violations of the equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the majority determined that, using affirmative action as a way of righting past wrongs against racial and ethnic minorities, state universities can consider race as one of several criteria in making admissions decisions.

Harvard is the oldest university in the United States, founded in 1636. In 2023, Harvard received more than 60,000 applications and admitted fewer than 2,000 students. Harvard used a four-step admission process to select applications. First, a “first reader” rated each application in six criteria; one of those six criteria took race into consideration. Second, subcommittees divided by geographic region met to consider all applications from the region; the subcommittees could and did take race into account. Third, the full 40-member committee met to discuss each application; the committee considered the overall racial makeup of the potential entering class, with the goal of assuring there was no “dramatic drop-off” in minority admissions from one year to the next. Fourth and finally, the lowest-ranked potential students were placed on a “lop list” to be cut from the final enrollment offers; the list includes only four pieces of information: legacy status, recruited athlete status, financial aid eligibility, and race. From the “lop list,” the full committee would make cuts and then offer admission.

Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. (SFAI) is a nonprofit legal-advocacy organization representing its applicant-members, formed for the purpose of eliminating race-based preferences in college admissions. Based on Harvard’s admissions process, SFAI filed suit, alleging violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court found that Harvard’s process was permissible because it was not a racial quota, but only a process that considered race as one of several criteria in making admissions decisions. SFAI appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court rejected the trial court’s finding. It overruled the parts of its decision in Board of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke that allowed consideration of race as a “plus” among several factors. Under “strict scrutiny,” the Court held that Harvard’s process was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Although admissions processes that consider racial makeup to assure minority admissions were held to be illegal, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit universities from considering discussion of how race affected the applicant’s life, so long as that discussion is concretely tied to a quality of character or unique ability that the particular applicant can contribute to the university.

In August 1984, the Republican Party was holding its National Convention in Dallas, Texas. A group of about 100 demonstrators marched through the streets of Dallas to dramatize the consequences of nuclear war and to protest certain policies of the Reagan administration. Gregory Johnson was a leader and organizer of the group. When the group reached Dallas City Hall, an American flag was handed to Johnson who soaked it in kerosene and set it on fire. Several individuals who witnessed this were offended by Johnson’s action. However, no violence occurred, and no one was physically injured or threatened. Shortly after the event, police arrived and arrested Johnson. He was charged with desecration of a venerated object in violation of the Texas Penal Code. Johnson was convicted in a Texas trial court, sentenced to one year in jail, and assessed a $2,000 fine. A Texas Court of Appeals upheld his conviction, but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the lower court and thus overturned Johnson’s conviction. The state of Texas appealed to the Supreme Court.

By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals overturning Johnson’s conviction. The majority held that burning a flag as political protest is a form of symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment. The majority wrote: “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable… We do not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents.”

After the 1990 census, North Carolina was eligible to gain a twelfth seat in the U. S. House of Representatives. Complying with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the state submitted to the U. S. Department of Justice a plan with only one majority-African American district. The plan was rejected because a second majority-African American district could have been created. The North Carolina legislature created a second majority-African American district approximately 160 miles along an interstate highway and for much of its length no wider than the interstate corridor. Several white voters, including a Duke University law professor, attacked the constitutionality of that district in a U. S. District Court. They argued that the new district paid no attention to traditional districting concerns such as compactness, contiguousness, geographical boundaries, or existing political subdivisions. They asserted that the sole purpose was to create two districts that were likely to elect African American representatives. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that under a previous Supreme Court decision, favoring minority voters was not constitutionally discriminatory and the plan did not proportionally underrepresent white voters statewide. The plaintiffs then appealed to the Supreme Court.

By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court ruled that Shaw and the other plaintiffs had stated a “claim upon which relief can be granted under the Equal Protection Clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority thus invalidated North Carolina’s plan on the grounds that any gerrymander based on race, even one designed to benefit a minority, is subject to strict scrutiny equal protection analysis.

In 1990, basing its authority to do so on the Constitution’s commerce clause of Article I, Section 8, the U. S. Congress adopted the Gun-Free School Zones Act. The law made it a federal crime to possess a firearm within 1,000 feet of a public or private school. Alfonso Lopez, a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, was arrested for carrying a .38 caliber handgun into the school. Initially, he was charged with violating a Texas law forbidding firearm possession on school premises. However, those charges were dropped after federal agents charged him with violating Congress’ Gun-Free School Zones Act. Lopez was convicted in a U. S. District Court, but on appeal, his attorneys argued that Congress’ Gun-Free School Zones Act was unconstitutional because Congress exceeded its power under the commerce clause. A U. S. Court of Appeals agreed and reversed Lopez’s conviction. The U. S. then appealed to the Supreme Court.

By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and ruled that Congress did not have constitutional authority under the commerce clause to pass the Gun-Free School Zones Act. The majority held that “the possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.”

This was the first time since 1937 that the Supreme Court had declared an act of Congress based on the commerce clause of Article I, Section 8 unconstitutional.

The presidential election of 2000 was one of the closest in American history with the outcome depending on the narrow popular vote in Florida. At issue was the problem of so-called non-votes on punch card ballots. If a voter failed to punch through on the ballot and left a “hanging chad,” then the vote might not be counted. If a voter failed to punch through on the ballot and left only an indent, then the vote might not count. On December 8, 2000, the Florida Supreme Court ordered a recount in some Florida counties and a recount in all the counties for these types of ballots.

On December 12 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Florida Supreme Court. By a 7-2 vote, the Court held that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision violated the equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. By a different 5-4 vote, the Court held that there was no remedy available. Since December 13 was the deadline for states to verify their presidential election elections, the majority felt that it would be impossible to create a recount procedure that would be uniform throughout the state during that time, and thus, a recount was not possible without offending the Equal Protection clause. The recount standards and procedures would vary from county to county and even from one election judge to another. Under those circumstances, there was no guarantee that each vote would be treated equally.

What the majority of the Supreme Court did was to order a stop to any recount of the Florida vote. That in turn meant that since George W. Bush had slightly more popular votes in the state than did Al Gore, Bush won all of Florida’s electoral votes. That in turn meant that Bush became President because, with all of Florida’s electoral votes, he ended up with 271 electoral votes, one more than the 270 needed to win.

Years of economic decline led the state of Connecticut in 1990 to designate New London, Connecticut “a distressed municipality.” The city’s unemployment was nearly double that of the rest of the state and the city’s population was at its lowest since 1920. As a result, state and local officials target New London for economic revitalization. The pharmaceutical company Pfizer announced it would build a research facility in the Fort Trumbull area of New London. The hope was that this would draw new business to the area. This would not only create jobs but also generate new tax revenue. The New London City Council authorized the New London Development Corporation to purchase property or to acquire property by using the power of eminent domain in the city’s name. The NLDC managed to purchase most real estate in the area, but when negotiations with some homeowners failed, the NLDC initiated condemnation proceedings against them under the city’s eminent domain power. Susette Kelo lived in the area, and in December, 2000, she and some other homeowners of condemned property sued the city of New London in a state trial court. They argued that the taking of their property, even with just compensation, violated “the public use” requirement of the U. S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment because their property would not be used for a “public purpose” like building a road but would instead be sold to private parties for development that the city claimed would benefit the community economically. The trial court issued a restraining order prohibiting New London’s taking of the property, but on appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court for the city. Kelo and the others then appealed to the Supreme Court.

By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court affirmed the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision and thus ruled against Susette Kelo and the other property owners. A majority of the Court “rejected a literal interpretation” of the term “public use” in the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment and ruled that the words “public use” can be interpreted to mean “public benefit.” Consequently, the majority determined that government can take private property from an individual in order to turn it over to a private developer where the taking will result in “economic development” for the area.

The City of Chicago had a law which effectively banned handgun possession by almost all private citizens. After the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v Heller in 2008, Otis McDonald and some other citizens of Chicago filed suit in U. S. District Court against the City. They argued that Chicago’s ban left them vulnerable to criminals and sought a declaration that the City’s ban violated the Second Amendment. The District Court rejected their argument. A U. S. Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s judgment, and McDonald appealed to the Supreme Court.

By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment and ruled in favor of McDonald. The majority held that the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “incorporates” the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms for self-defense and thus applies this right to state and local governments.

The Supreme Court thus for the first time in U. S. history ruled that the Second Amendment, like most of the other rights of the Bill of Rights, now applies to and limits the power of state and local governments through its “incorporation” by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process of law clause.

For nearly a century, in order to reduce the influence of big money in politics, Congress has restricted political campaign contributions in federal elections in a variety of ways. As adopted by Congress, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, popularly known as McCain-Feingold, prohibited corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a specified candidate. This case arose as a result of a conservative, non-profit organization, Citizens United, wanting to air a film critical of Hillary Clinton and to advertise it during television broadcasts before the 2008 Democratic Party’s primary elections in which Hillary Clinton was a candidate for the Democratic Party’s nomination for President. This would have violated provisions of McCain-Feingold prohibiting certain electioneering communications near an election. Citizens United filed a motion in U. S. District Court for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of that provision of McCain-Feingold. The District Court denied Citizen United’s motion and granted judgment for the Federal Elections Commission. Citizens United appealed to the Supreme Court.

By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s judgment and ruled in favor of Citizens United. The majority held that portions of Congress’ McCain-Feingold law were unconstitutional violations of the freedom of speech of the First Amendment. The majority declared that “if the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech.” The majority noted that “corporations, as associations of individuals, have free speech rights. Spending money is essential to disseminating speech, and limiting a corporation’s ability to spend money is unconstitutional because it limits the ability of its members to associate effectively and to speak on political issues.” Finally, the majority noted, “speech would be suppressed in the realm where its necessity is most evident: in the public dialogue preceding a real election.” Government cannot make political speech a crime, the majority stated, and “yet this is the statute’s purpose and design.”

Congress adopted the Voting Rights Act in 1965 to address entrenched racial discrimination in voting. Most sections of the law only applied to certain parts of the country. Section 4 of the law provided “the coverage formula” defining the “covered jurisdictions” as states or their political subdivisions that maintained tests or devices as prerequisites for voting and had low voter registration or turnout in the 1960s and 1970s. In these “covered jurisdictions,” Section 5 of the law provided that no change in voting procedures can take effect until “pre-cleared” by specified federal authorities in Washington, D. C. Congress had renewed the Act several times without making changes to the original coverage area. Shelby County in “covered jurisdiction” Alabama sued U. S. Attorney General Eric Holder in U. S. District Court in Washington, D. C. seeking a declaratory judgment that Sections 4 and 5 were unconstitutional and an injunction against the enforcement of the Act. The District Court and the D.C. Circuit Court upheld the constitutionality of the law. Shelby County then appealed to the Supreme Court.

By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower courts and declared Section 4 of the Act and its “coverage formula” unconstitutional. As a result, the majority confirmed, its formula can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to the “pre-clearance” requirement of Section 5 of the Act. The majority noted that much has changed in the last 50 years. Literacy tests and other qualifying requirements have been banned for 40 years. The majority stated: “There is no denying, however, that the conditions that originally justified these measures no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions.” By 2009, the majority pointed out, “the racial gap in voter registration and turnout was lower in the states originally covered by Section 5 than it was nationwide.” Furthermore, the majority noted, “African American turnout in 5 of the 6 states originally covered by the law has come to exceed white voter turnout.”

The Affordable Care Act passed by Congress and upheld by the Supreme Court in 2012 required for profit corporations with 50 or more workers which offer health insurance to their workers to provide contraceptive coverage as part of a preventive care package for their female employees. Twenty contraceptives were covered including four “morning after” contraceptives that work after conception. The Obama administration argued that the contraceptive mandate is about health care. It pointed out that the policy is based on an Institute of Medicine report which lists contraception as a “preventive service” that, like immunizations and cholesterol and diabetes screening and dozens of other services, should be provided by a comprehensive health insurance policy. Hobby Lobby and two other closely held for profit corporations challenged the requirement based on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. This Act forbids government from imposing obligations on persons or corporations that violate their sincerely held religious beliefs. Hobby Lobby claimed that providing the four “morning after” contraceptives violated their sincerely held religious belief that life begins at conception.

By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court ruled that as applied to “closely held corporations” such as Hobby Lobby, the Department of Health and Human Services regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. In striking down the requirement, the majority held that the government had not shown that requiring the coverage was “the least restrictive means” of infringing on religious liberty.

David Riley was driving a vehicle in San Diego, California, when a police officer stopped him because the vehicle’s registration tags were expired. The officer soon learned that Riley was also driving with a suspended driver’s license. The officer asked Riley to get out of the car because, following police department policy, he was going to impound the vehicle. Then, again in accordance with San Diego Police Department policy, when an automobile is being impounded, the officer was required to do a thorough search/inventory of the contents of the vehicle, including enumerating specifically parts of the auto under the hood. Searching under the hood, the officer found two handguns. After the guns were found, police arrested Riley and, among other things, seized several items found either in the auto or on Riley’s person, including his smart phone. A detective searching the contents of the cellphone found a number of items which were introduced as evidence to charge him with several criminal offenses and were also introduced as evidence at Riley’s trial in a San Diego trial court. Riley moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the warrantless search of his vehicle and his cell phone. The trial court denied his motion, and he was convicted and sentenced to a prison term of 15 years to life. A California Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s judgment, and Riley appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decided Riley v California along with a similar federal case, United States v Wurie.

By a 9-0 vote, the Supreme Court overturned the decisions of the California courts and decided that, as a general rule, under the Fourth Amendment, without a warrant, police may not search information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been lawfully arrested. The Court emphasized that searches incident to a valid arrest are limited to the area within the immediate reach of the person arrested for police safety and to prevent the destruction of evidence, and the information on Riley’s cell phone could not pose a danger to officers and no evidence related to the weapons charge for which he was arrested was in danger of destruction. Therefore, the Court concluded, there being no “exigent circumstances” in this case to justify a warrantless search, the evidence was inadmissible.

Ohio defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman. James Obergefell met John Arthur decades ago, and they started a life together. In 2011, Arthur was diagnosed with an incurable disease. In 2013, the two men, resolving to marry before Arthur died, went to Maryland where they were legally wed. Three months later, Arthur died. Ohio law did not permit Obergefell to be listed as surviving spouse on Arthur’s death certificate. Obergefell brought suit in U. S. District Court to be shown as surviving spouse on Arthur’s death certificate. He challenged Ohio law on grounds that it denied same-sex couples the right to marry in the state or to have their out-of-state legal marriages recognized by Ohio and was thus a violation of the equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court ruled in Obergefell’s favor. At the same time, similar or identical cases arose and were decided by U. S. District Courts in Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee, and in every one of these, as in Obergefell’s case, the District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs challenging state laws like Ohio’s. All four cases arose in District Courts within the appellate jurisdiction of the same U. S. Court of Appeals which consolidated the cases for decision purposes and reversed the decisions of all four District Courts. The four cases were then appealed to the Supreme Court which consolidated them for purposes of decision.

By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the judgment of the Court of Appeals in all four cases and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The majority ruled that the due process of law and equal protection of the law clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize such marriages legally licensed and performed in other states. According to the majority, the hope of the couples in these cases “is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.”

In January of 2013, Tyson Timbs bought a $42,000 Land Rover with the proceeds of his father’s life insurance policy. Shortly after the purchase, Timbs began using the vehicle to transport heroin. Timbs was eventually arrested at a traffic stop and charged with felony distribution of a controlled substance and conspiracy to commit theft. He accepted a plea deal in order to dismiss part of the charges. The trial court sentenced Timbs to six years’ confinement and to pay fees and costs totaling approximately $1,200. In addition to the sentence, the state of Indiana sought to take Timbs’ Land Rover. The trial court denied the state’s action, interpreting this as a violation of the Excessive Fine Clause of the Eighth Amendment and disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense. The court also pointed out that the maximum fine for Timbs’ felony charge was $10,000 and that the vehicle was worth nearly four times that amount when Timbs bought it. The trial court ordered the state to return Timbs’ vehicle immediately and the court of appeals affirmed. The Indiana Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower courts’ decisions, stating that the US Supreme Court had never clearly incorporated the Eighth Amendment as to state action and that the state had justified their taking of the vehicle under state law.

The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with Timbs, incorporating the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to apply to the states. In the opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, the Court stated that the Excessive Fines Clause had its origins in the Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights and in state constitutions and is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty.”

A student at Mahanoy Area High School, B.L. tried out for the school’s varsity cheerleading team but made the junior varsity team instead. Over the weekend and away from school grounds, she posted a photo of herself on Snapchat making a vulgar gesture and with a vulgar caption, expressing frustration with the school and the school’s cheerleading squad. Approximately 250 people potentially saw the photo, including both fellow students and cheerleaders. The cheer coach was notified and decided that B.L.’s snap violated both team and school rules and B.L. was subsequently suspended from the junior varsity team for a year. In response to her suspension, B.L. sued the school in federal court, stating that the punishment violated the First Amendment because the school and team rules were overly broad and unconstitutionally vague. The district court agreed with B.L. that the school had violated her First Amendment rights and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.

The Supreme Court ruled in an 8-1 decision that the school district’s suspension of B.L. from the cheerleading team for posting vulgar language about the school to social media violated the First Amendment. The majority opinion of the court recognized that while public schools may regulate student speech and conduct on and off campus, there are limitations to what the schools can regulate. Particularly, the court noted that B.L. spoke in circumstances where her parents and not the school had responsibility and that her speech did not cause “substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.” The court determined that her speech was protected by the First Amendment and the school’s punishment violated her First Amendment rights.

New York law, for about the last century, has required an individual applying for a license to carry a firearm in public to demonstrate a “proper cause” to justify the application. Proper cause has been associated with the idea of self-protection. So, in order to be licensed to carry a gun, the applicant must show a special need for self-protection.

Robert Nash & Brandon Koch were two men whose individual applications were denied for failing to demonstrate a heightened need for self-protection. The New York Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc, a 2nd Amendment gun rights interest group, joined Nash and Koch in a lawsuit against New York State.

The task before the Supreme Court was to determine whether New York’s statutory license requirement to show “proper cause” (i.e., self-protection) to carry handguns in public violates the 2nd Amendment. In a 6-3 decision, the Court determined the century-old law was a direct violation of the Constitution. The Court, in its majority opinion, relied on a historic interpretation of the amendment. The Court held that the right to carry a firearm in public for self-defense is deeply rooted in American history, comparing it to the rights to free speech, free exercise of religion, and confrontation of witnesses, which may be exercised without first “demonstrating to government officers some special need.” The Court also saw no distinction between gun rights at home versus in public but acknowledged that this does not prohibit states from imposing limitations on places where guns can be carried.

At the request of Special Prosecutor Jack Smith, a grand jury indicted Donald Trump in August 2023 for four counts arising from conduct that occurred on January 6, 2021, during his first presidential term. The indictment alleged that, after losing the 2020 election, he knowingly spread false claims of election fraud to obstruct certification of the election results. Trump moved to dismiss the indictments based on absolute presidential immunity. In a motion to dismiss, Trump argued that he could not be criminally prosecuted unless he were first impeached by the House and convicted by the Senate for that conduct. The government argued that a former President has no immunity from criminal prosecution.

The District Court denied Trump’s claims of presidential immunity and denied the motion to dismiss; the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision. Trump appealed to the Supreme Court.

A divided Supreme Court, 6-3, rejected both Trump’s argument requiring impeachment before prosecution, and the government’s argument that former Presidents have no immunity. The Supreme Court instead held that a former President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his “conclusive and preclusive” authority, has at least presumptive immunity for all official acts, and no immunity for unofficial acts.

Where the Constitution grants the President exclusive power, the legislature cannot criminalize actions and the courts cannot prosecute crimes based on that “conclusive and preclusive” power, due to constitutional separation of powers. The former President is immune from criminal prosecution for conduct within the exclusive presidential sphere of constitutional authority. Examples of exclusive powers include those defined in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, such as the power to grant reprieves and pardons.

The President is not above the law, but cannot be prosecuted for exercising core Constitutional powers, and is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution from official acts. In order to prosecute a former president for alleged criminal acts in office, the prosecution would have to rebut the presumption by proving that the criminal conduct was not an official act.

Loper Bright Enterprises operates a fishing vessel in the Atlantic. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) acts under the authority of the Department of Commerce to administer federal fishing conservation and management law in the north-Atlantic region of the United States.

When creating federal agencies, the legislature can delegate some of its power to executive agencies. However, when delegating its powers, the legislature must specify what authority it gives the agency, and must place limits on the authority to avoid nondelegation issues. Within the delegation of legislative power, the executive agency can issue regulations that clarify, but do not expand, the powers granted by the legislature.

In the federal fishing regulations, the legislature allowed NMFS to require observation for compliance and to collect fees. However, the law was silent as to the methods of observation and fee collection. NMFS’s regulations required fishing companies, including Loper Bright, to carry an observer on board to assure compliance, and required the companies to reimburse NMFS for the observer’s salary.

Loper Bright challenged NMFS’s regulation in an administrative hearing, arguing that NMFS’s regulations violated the nondelegation doctrine. Loper Bright lost the administrative challenge and appealed to federal District Court.

The District Court dismissed the case and held that it could not review NMFS’s decision because of well-established Supreme Court precedent dating back to 1984. See Chevron vs. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (467 U.S. 837), supra. Under the Chevron analysis framework, a court could not review an agency’s rule unless the rule expressly contradicted a federal statute, because it could not substitute its judicial opinion for an executive action that did not contradict laws passed by the legislature. This deference effectively gave agency determinations the force and effect of a statute in the federal courts, unless the determinations exceeded the legislative powers delegated to the agency. On appeal, the Supreme Court expressly overturned Chevron. The Court did not articulate the new standard to be applied, only that the standard the District Court used, applying Chevron, was incorrect. The Court remanded the case to the District Court to exercise its independent judgment and perform its own analysis when deciding whether NMFS acted within its statutory authority, and what constitutes the “best” reading of the statute. Although the Supreme Court cited the 1944 Skidmore case that articulated a pre-Chevron standard, the Court stopped short of holding that the Skidmore standard applied.

A group of concerned parents challenged the language-arts curriculum set by Montgomery County, Maryland Public Schools. The district-approved 2022-23 curriculum included some storybooks featuring characters of non-heterosexual orientations who acted outside traditional gender roles; the curriculum also included books that featured heterosexual characters acting in traditional gender roles.

When the district announced the curriculum, some parents requested that their children be opted out of any school activities related to books featuring homosexual characters or those acting outside traditional gender roles. Teachers and principals initially made efforts to accommodate the parents, and the school district announced that it would allow parents to opt out of those lessons. Soon after, the district determined that permitting opt-outs for parents was not feasible or consistent with its curricular goals, and would violate anti-discrimination laws. The district cited classroom disruption, excessive absenteeism, and stigmatizing people whose identities were reflected in the books. The parents, who were of several religious backgrounds, sued alleging a violation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise clause. They sought an injunction to allow them to opt out of any discussions involving subjects they found violated their religious teachings. The trial court denied the injunction; the parents appealed.

On appeal, Justice Alito wrote for the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that the restriction is subject to strict scrutiny, that an educational curriculum that included the storybooks as a requirement constituted an unconstitutional burden on the parents’ rights to direct their children’s educations if the parents could not opt their children out of the lessons, and so the Court reversed and remanded for the district court to reconsider the injunction based upon this analysis.